Through modeling the strand space of a mutual authentication cryptographic protocol in network management, on the basis of minimal members and ideal theory of strand space model, the security and authentication of this protocol are analyzed. The analysis results show that the proposed protocol can satisfy the authentication and confidentiality. At the same time, based on the authentication design of the protocol, this paper presents the difference of the authentication protocol based on the asymmetric cryptosystem and the symmetric cryptosystem.
INTRODUCTION
The correctness of the authentication protocol is an important prerequisite for secure communication, and key distribution is often the main task of the authentication protocol. However, it is difficult to design a protocol which meets the confidentiality and authentication. Therefore, the protocol must be analyzed for the correctness before it is used. According to the needs of specific network environment, mutual recognition card password protocol for network management was designed based on BAN logic in the literature (Zheng, Li and Zhang,2003) . The protocol consists of authentication and key distribution and data transmission. The first part of the protocolof the top part is the key to the safety, and it directly decides the security protocol for data transmission. Therefore, we must analyze the first part of the protocol from the authentication and confidentiality. Previous experience of authentication protocol analysis shows that the analysis method based on strand space model is a kind of efficient and precise and intuitive method in the analysis of protocol authentication and confidentiality (Fábrega, Herzog and Guttman,1998; Fábrega, Herzog and Guttman,1999) .
BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF STRAND SPACE MODEL
Strand is a finite sequence of sending and receiving messages by the honest body or the intruder in the protocol. Suppose the set A is a collection of all the exchanged messages during the execution of the protocol, in which the elements in the set A are called items. 1  tt represents that 1 t is a child of the t .  TA is the body set,  KA is the key set, here    KT .
Basic concept of strand space
Definition 1Symbol item is a two tuple , 
2.2.Fundamental theorem of strand space
Theorem 1 Suppose C is a bundle, then  c is a partial order relation, with reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. Any non-empty nodes subset of bundle C under the partial order relation  c has minimal members.
Theorem 2 Suppose
C is a bundle,  SC is node set and satisfying the following properties: K is a session key between A and B generated by A .
3.PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION AND STRAND SPACE MODEL

3.1.Protocol description
R is the requesting information sent from A to B ,and n C is the message number in a session between the entities in this protocol. The objective of the protocol is : A and B can authenticate each other, and B achieves to distribute the session key K to A . 2) Strand spaces model of the protocol Definition 9 Suppose ( , )  P is the penetration strand space of the protocol, of which the strand definition is the following:
Penetrator strand:
Init Init A B N N K R C , the corresponding body is A , here the trace of the element  s is:
Responder strand set Re Re [ , , , , , , ]  A B n sp sp A B N N K R C , the corresponding body is B , the trace of the element  s is: S n C N term n v term n has a  minimal member 2 n ,the node 2 n is a regular node and the symbol is positive.
AUTHENTICATION ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOL
The certification of responder
Proof Because 3  nC and
S is a non-empty set. According to theorem 1, there is at least a  minimum 2 n , by theorem 2, the symbol of 2 n is positive. Now prove that 2 n is not possible in the intruder strand. Referring to the definition 7, 2 n obviously cannot be in the strands of F ， T ， K ， C ,consider the remaining case: , { } ,
n is on the strand, by the nature minimal member of 2 n , 
, by definition 9 we can see that there is not a regular node in the protocol strand space which contains the sub item 11 gh, so all nodes of the set T are intruder nodes. Clearly, gh belongs to the set T , so T is not empty, by theorem 1 known T has a  minimal member and is sending a message node. So consider all the intruder strands again to verify the existence of this minimal element, clearly, the minimal element of T is not possible on the strands of
the minimal element of the set T is on this strand, it must be '' 11  g h g h . Because 1 g and 1 h are simple terms, it can be concluded
no matter what kind of situation is the premise with the conclusion that g is a  minimum element of the set S . So, 2 n is not possible on the intruder strand. And 2 n must be on a regular strand. Lemma 3 There is a node 2 n on the strand t , whose predecessor node is 1 n ,and 
But there is no regular node using a public key encryption as the sub item, therefore there must
term n , this lemma is proved. Lemma 4 The regular strand t containing 1 n and 2 n is a initiator strand of bundle C . Proof Node 2 n is a regular node whose the symbol is a positive, and its precursor node 1 n has form of
If t is a responder strand, then after the item like
, it can only be one node of symbol for a negative node. So t is an initiator strand. Thus 1 n and 2 n are respectively the second and third nodes on t . Since the last node of t are included in the bundle C , there is ( ) 3  C height t . Lemma 5 Suppose  is the strand space of authentication protocol, and N is the only origin in  , there can be at most one initiator strand t . By lemmas 1 to 5, proposition 1 is proved. The protocol satisfies responder certification, simultaneously also meet the initiator of the certification agreement according to the proof of proposition 1.
Proof For any
A ， B ， A N ， K ， R ， n C , B N
Certification analysis summary
Based on the analysis of the above proposition, it shows that the protocol satisfies the authentication. In the process of certification of responder analysis, if using the session key K delivered by the protocol body B to replace the temporary value lacks the identification of the body B , it is difficult to confirm the shared object of the session key K . Thus it can be seen that temporary value B N can protect against message replay and forwarding attacks, and effectively identify shared objects of the session key, so there is no temporary value redundancy in the protocol.
CONFIDENTIALITY ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOL
Confidentiality analysis
Lemma 6 Suppose secret key IS, the proposition is proved.
Confidentiality analysis and summary
The analysis shows that the protocol satisfies the confidentiality; at the same time, it can be known by lemma 6, that the certification of protocol body can be built on top of the private key in the authentication protocol based on asymmetric cryptography authentication. In the design of authentication protocols, it keeps distinction based on symmetric cryptography authentication protocol, and usually the latter's authenticity builds on a provisional value and time stamp.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper bases on the theory of strand space model, using the minimal element and ideal theory to analyze the authentication and confidentiality of the mutual recognition of license cryptographic protocol in literature (Fábrega , Herzog and Guttman,1998) . Through the analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) the protocol satisfies the authentication and confidentiality. (2) there is no temporary value redundancy of responder in the protocol. (3) the authentication of the authentication protocol based on the asymmetric cryptosystem can be established on the private key.
